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Abstract
This paper considers the quantum query complexity of ε-biased oracles that return the correct
value with probability only 1/2+ ε. In particular, we show a quantum algorithm to compute N -bit
OR functions with O(
√
N/ε) queries to ε-biased oracles. This improves the known upper bound of
O(
√
N/ε2) and matches the known lower bound; we answer the conjecture raised by the paper [13]
affirmatively. We also show a quantum algorithm to cope with the situation in which we have no
knowledge about the value of ε. This contrasts with the corresponding classical situation, where it
is almost hopeless to achieve more than a constant success probability without knowing the value
of ε.
1 Introduction
Quantum computation has attracted much attention since Shor’s celebrated quantum algorithm for
factoring large integers [15] and Grover’s quantum search algorithm [11]. One of the central issues in
this research field has been the quantum query complexity, where we are interested in both upper and
lower bounds of a necessary number of oracle calls to solve certain problems [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 14]. In
these studies, oracles are assumed to be perfect, i.e., they return the correct value with certainty.
In the classical case, there have been many studies (e.g., [10]) that discuss the case of when oracles
are imperfect (or often called noisy), i.e., they may return incorrect answers. In the quantum setting,
Høyer et al. [12] proposed an excellent quantum algorithm, which we call the robust quantum search
algorithm hereafter, to compute the OR function of N values, each of which can be accessed through a
quantum “imperfect” oracle. Their quantum “imperfect” oracle can be described as follows: When the
content of the query register is x (1 ≤ x ≤ N), the oracle returns a quantum pure state from which
we can measure the correct value of f(x) with a constant probability. This noise model naturally
fits into quantum subroutines with errors. (Note that most existing quantum algorithms have some
errors.) More precisely, their algorithm robustly computes N -bit OR functions with O(
√
N) queries
to an imperfect oracle, which is only a constant factor worse than the perfect oracle case. Thus, they
claim that their algorithm does not need a serious overhead to cope with the imperfectness of the
oracles. Their method has been extended to a robust quantum algorithm to output all the N bits by
using O(N) queries [9] by Buhrman et al. This obviously implies that O(N) queries are enough to
compute the parity of the N bits, which contrasts with the classical Ω(N logN) lower bound given
in [10].
It should be noted that, in the classical setting, we do not need an overhead to compute OR
functions with imperfect oracles either, i.e., O(N) queries are enough to compute N -bit OR functions
even if an oracle is imperfect [10]. Nevertheless, the robust quantum search algorithm by Høyer et
al. [12] implies that we can still enjoy the quadratic speed-up of the quantum search when computing
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OR functions, even in the imperfect oracle case, i.e., O(
√
N) vs. O(N). However, this is not true
when we consider the probability of getting the correct value from the imperfect oracles explicitly by
using the following model: When the query register is x, the oracle returns a quantum pure state from
which we can measure the correct value of f(x) with probability 1/2+ εx, where we assume ε ≤ εx for
any x and we know the value of ε. In this paper, we call this imperfect quantum oracle an ε-biased
oracle (or a biased oracle for short) by following the paper [13]. Then, the precise query complexity
of the above robust quantum search algorithm to compute OR functions with an ε-biased oracle can
be rewritten as O(
√
N/ε2), which can also be found in [9]. For the same problem, we need O(N/ε2)
queries in the classical setting since O(1/ε2) instances of majority voting of the output of an ε-biased
oracle is enough to boost the success probability to some constant value. This means that the above
robust quantum search algorithm does not achieve the quadratic speed-up anymore if we consider the
error probability explicitly.
Adcock et al. [2] first considered the error probability explicitly in the quantum oracles, then
Iwama et al. [13] continued to study ε-biased oracles: they show the lower bound of computing OR
is Ω(
√
N/ε) and the matching upper bound when εx are the same for all x. Unfortunately, this
restriction to oracles obviously cannot be applied in general. Therefore, for the general biased oracles,
there have been a gap between the lower and upper bounds although the paper [13] conjectures that
they should match at Θ(
√
N/ε).
Our Contribution. In this paper, we show that the robust quantum search can be done with
O(
√
N/ε) queries. Thus, we answer the conjecture raised by the paper [13] affirmatively, meaning that
we can still enjoy the quantum quadratic speed-up to compute OR functions even when we consider
the error probability explicitly. The overhead factor of 1/ε2 in the complexity of the original robust
quantum search (i.e., O(
√
N/ε2)) essentially comes from the classical majority voting in their recursive
algorithm. Thus, our basic strategy is to utilize quantum amplitude amplification and estimation [7]
instead of majority voting to boost the success probability to some constant value. This overall
strategy is an extension of the idea in the paper [13], but we carefully perform the quantum amplitude
amplification and estimation in quantum parallelism with appropriate accuracy to avoid the above-
mentioned restriction to oracles assumed in [13].
In most existing (classical and quantum) algorithms with imperfect oracles, it is implicitly assumed
that we know the value of ε. Otherwise, it seems impossible to know when we can stop the trial of
majority voting with a guarantee of a more than constant success probability of the whole algorithm.
However, we show that, in the quantum setting, we can construct a robust algorithm even when ε
is unknown. More precisely, we can estimate unknown ε with appropriate accuracy, which then can
be used to construct robust quantum algorithms. Our estimation algorithm also utilizes quantum
amplitude estimation, thus it can be considered as an interesting application of quantum amplitude
amplification, which seems to be impossible in the classical setting.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the quantum computing and the query complexity. We also define
quantum biased oracles.
2.1 Quantum State and Evolution
A state of n-qubit quantum register |ψ〉 is a superposition of 2n classical strings with length n, i.e.,
|ψ〉 = ∑x αx|x〉 where x ∈ {0, 1}n and the amplitudes αx are complex numbers consistent with the
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normalization condition:
∑
x |αx|2 = 1. If we measure the state |ψ〉 with respect to the standard basis,
we observe |x〉 with probability |αx|2 and after the measurement the state |ψ〉 collapses into |x〉.
Without measurements, a quantum system can evolve satisfying the normalization condition.
These evolutions are represented by unitary transformations. The following Fourier transform is
a famous example that acts on several qubits.
Definition 1 For any integer M ≥ 1, a quantum Fourier transform FM is defined by
FM : |x〉 7−→ 1√
M
M−1∑
y=0
e2πıxy/M |y〉 (0 ≤ x < M).
In this paper, unitary transformations controlled by other registers are often used. For example, one
of them acts as some unitary transformation if the control qubit is |1〉, otherwise it acts as identity.
The following operator ΛM is also one of their applications.
Definition 2 For any integer M ≥ 1 and any unitary operator U, the operator ΛM (U) is defined by
|j〉|y〉 7−→
{
|j〉Uj |y〉 (0 ≤ j < M)
|j〉UM |y〉 (j ≥M).
ΛM is controlled by the first register |j〉 in this case. ΛM (U) uses U for M times.
It is also known that quantum transformations can compute all classical functions. Let g be any
classically computable function with m input and k output bits. Then, there exists a unitary trans-
formation Ug corresponding to the computation of g: for any x ∈ {0, 1}m and y ∈ {0, 1}k , Ug maps
|x〉|y〉 to |x〉|y ⊕ g(x)〉, where ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive-OR.
2.2 Query Complexity
In this paper, we are interested in the query complexity, which is discussed in the following model.
Suppose we want to compute some function F with an N -bit input and we can access each bit only
through a given oracle O. The query complexity is the number of queries to the oracle. A quantum
algorithm with T queries is a sequence of unitary transformations: U0 → O1 → U1 → . . .→ OT → UT ,
where Oi denotes the unitary transformation corresponding to the i-th query to the oracle O, and Ui
denotes an arbitrary unitary transformation independent of the oracle. Our natural goal is to find
an algorithm to compute F with sufficiently large probability and with the smallest number of oracle
calls.
The most natural quantum oracles are quantum perfect oracles Of that map |x〉|0m−1〉|0〉 to
|x〉|0m−1〉|f(x)〉 for any x ∈ [N ]. Here, |0m−1〉 is a work register that is always cleared before and after
querying oracles. On the other hand, quantum biased oracles, which we deal with in this paper, are
defined as follows.
Definition 3 A quantum oracle of a Boolean function f with bias ε is a unitary transformation Oεf
or its inverse Oεf
† such that
Oεf |x〉|0m−1〉|0〉 = |x〉(αx|wx〉|f(x)〉+ βx|w′x〉|f(x)〉),
where |αx|2 = 1/2 + εx ≥ 1/2 + ε for any x ∈ [N ]. Let also εmin = min
x
εx.
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Note that 0 < ε ≤ εmin ≤ εx ≤ 1/2 for any x. In practice, ε is usually given in some way and εmin
or εx may be unknown. Unless otherwise stated, we discuss the query complexity with a given biased
oracle Oεf in the rest of the paper.
We can also consider phase flip oracles instead of the above-defined bit flip oracles. A (perfect)
phase flip oracle is defined as a map: |x〉|0m−1〉 7−→ (−1)f(x)|x〉|0m−1〉, which is equivalent to the
corresponding bit flip oracle Of in the perfect case, since either oracle can be easily simulated by the
other oracle with a pair of Hadmard gates. In a biased case, however, the two oracles cannot always
be converted to each other. We need to take care of interference of the work registers, i.e., |wx〉 and
|w′x〉, which are dealt with carefully in our algorithm.
2.3 Amplitude Amplification and Estimation
We briefly introduce a few known quantum algorithms often used in the following sections. In [7],
Brassard et al. presented amplitude amplification as follows.
Theorem 1 Let A be any quantum algorithm that uses no measurements and χ : Z → {0, 1} be any
Boolean function that distinguishes between success or fail (good or bad). There exists a quantum
algorithm that given the initial success probability p > 0 of A, finds a good solution with certainty
using a number of applications of A and A−1, which is in O( 1√p) in the worst case.
In the amplitude amplification, a unitary operator Q = −AS0A−1Sχ is used. Here, S0 denotes an
operator to flip the sign of amplitude of the state |0〉, and Sχ denotes an operator to flip the signs of
amplitudes of all the good states. Applying Q to the state A|0〉 for j times, we have
QjA|0〉 = 1√
p
sin((2j + 1)θp) |Ψ1〉+ 1√
1− p cos((2j + 1)θp) |Ψ0〉,
where |Ψ1〉 has all the good states, and 〈Ψ1|Ψ1〉 = p = sin2(θp) and |Ψ1〉 is orthogonal to |Ψ0〉. After
applying Q for about π/4θp ∈ O(1/√p) times, we can measure a good solution with probability close
to 1. Note that we need to know information about the value of p in some way to do so. See [7] for
more details.
Brassard et al. also presented amplitude estimation in [7]. We rewrite it in terms of phase
estimation as follows.
Theorem 2 Let A, χ and p be as in Theorem 1 and θp = sin−1(√p) such that 0 ≤ θp ≤ π/2.
There exists a quantum algorithm Est Phase(A, χ,M) that outputs θ˜p such that |θp − θ˜p| ≤ πM , with
probability at least 8/π2. It uses exactly M invocations of A and χ, respectively. If θp = 0 then θ˜p = 0
with certainty, and if θp = π/2 and M is even, then θ˜p = π/2 with certainty.
3 Computing OR with ε-Biased Oracles
In this section, we assume that we have information about bias rate of the given biased oracle: a value
of ε such that 0 < ε ≤ εmin. Under this assumption, in Theorem 3 we show that N -bit OR functions
can be computed by using O(
√
N/ε) queries to the given oracle Oεf . Moreover, when we know εmin,
we can present an optimal algorithm to compute OR with Oεf . Before describing the main theorem,
we present the following key lemma.
Lemma 1 There exists a quantum algorithm that simulates a single query to an oracle O
1/6
f by using
O(1/ε) queries to Oεf if we know ε.
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To prove the lemma, we replace the given oracle Oεf with a new oracle O˜
ε
f for our convenience. The
next lemma describes the oracle O˜εf and how to construct it from O
ε
f .
Lemma 2 There exists a quantum oracle O˜εf that consists of one O
ε
f and one O
ε
f
† such that for any
x ∈ [N ]
O˜εf |x, 0m, 0〉 = (−1)f(x)2εx|x, 0m, 0〉+ |x, ψx〉, (1)
where |x, ψx〉 is orthogonal to |x, 0m, 0〉 and its norm is
√
1− 4εx2.
Proof. We can show the construction of O˜εf in a similar way in Lemma 1 in [13]. ⊓⊔
⊓⊔
Now, we describe our approach to Lemma 1. The oracle O
1/6
f is simulated by the given oracle
Oεf based on the following idea. According to [13], if the query register |x〉 is not in a superposition,
phase flip oracles can be simulated with sufficiently large probability: by using amplitude estimation
through O˜εf , we can estimate the value of εx, then by using the estimated value and applying amplitude
amplification to the state in (1), we can obtain the state (−1)f(x)|x, 0m, 0〉 with high probability. In
Lemma 1, we essentially simulate the phase flip oracle by using the above algorithm in a superposition
of |x〉. Note that we convert the phase flip oracle into the bit flip version in the lemma.
We will present the proof of Lemma 1 after the following lemma, which shows that amplitude
estimation can work in quantum parallelism. Est Phase in Theorem 2 is straightforwardly extended
to Par Est Phase in Lemma 3, whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 3 Let χ : Z→ {0, 1} be any Boolean function, and let O be any quantum oracle that uses no
measurements such that
O|x〉|0〉 = |x〉Ox|0〉 = |x〉|Ψx〉 = |x〉(|Ψ1x〉+ |Ψ0x〉),
where a state |Ψx〉 is divided into a good state |Ψ1x〉 and a bad state |Ψ0x〉 by χ. Let sin2(θx) =
〈Ψ1x|Ψ1x〉 be the success probability of Ox|0〉 where 0 ≤ θx ≤ π/2. There exists a quantum algorithm
Par Est Phase(O, χ,M) that changes states as follows:
|x〉|0〉|0〉 7−→ |x〉 ⊗
M−1∑
j=0
δx,j|vx,j〉|θ˜x,j〉,
where
∑
j:|θx−θ˜x,j |≤ πM
|δx,j |2 ≥ 8
π2
for any x, and |vx,i〉 and |vx,j〉 are mutually orthonormal vectors for
any i, j. It uses O and its inverse for O(M) times.
Proof. (of Lemma 1)
We will show a quantum algorithm that changes states as follows:
|x〉|0〉|0〉 7−→ |x〉(αx|wx〉|f(x)〉+ βx|w′x〉|f(x)〉),
where |αx|2 ≥ 2/3 for any x, using O(1/ε) queries to Oεf . The algorithm performs amplitude amplifi-
cation following amplitude estimation in a superposition of |x〉.
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At first, we use amplitude estimation in parallel to estimate εx or to know how many times the
following amplitude amplification procedures should be repeated. Let sin θ = 2ε and sin θx = 2εx
such that 0 < θ, θx ≤ π/2. Note that Θ(θ) = Θ(ε) since sin θ ≤ θ ≤ π2 sin θ when 0 ≤ θ ≤ π/2.
Let also M1 =
⌈
3π(π+1)
θ
⌉
and χ be a Boolean function that divides a state in (1) into a good state
(−1)f(x)2εx|0m+1〉 and a bad state |ψx〉. The function χ checks only whether the state is |0m+1〉 or
not; therefore, it is implemented easily. By Lemma 3, Par Est Phase(O˜εf ,χ,M1) maps
|x〉|0〉|0〉|0〉 7−→ |x〉 ⊗
M−1∑
j=0
δx,j|vx,j〉|θ˜x,j〉|0〉,
where
∑
j:|θx−θ˜x,j |≤ θ3(π+1)
|δx,j |2 ≥ 8
π2
for any x, and |vx,i〉 and |vx,j〉 are mutually orthonormal vectors
for any i, j. This state has the good estimations of θx in the third register with high probability. The
fourth register |0〉 remains large enough to perform the following steps.
The remaining steps basically perform amplitude amplification by using the estimated values θ˜x,j,
which can realize a phase flip oracle. Note that in the following steps a pair of Hadmard transformations
are used to convert the phase flip oracle into our targeted oracle.
Based on the de-randomization idea as in [13], we calculate m∗x,j =
⌈
1
2
(
π
2θ˜x,j
− 1
)⌉
, θ∗x,j =
π
4m∗x,j+2
,
p∗x,j = sin
2(θ∗x,j) and p˜x,j = sin
2(θ˜x,j) in the superposition, and apply an Hadmard transformation to
the last qubit. Thus we have
|x〉
(M−1∑
j=0
δx,j |vx,j〉|θ˜x,j〉|m∗x,j〉|θ∗x,j〉|p∗x,j〉|p˜x,j〉 ⊗ |0m+1〉|0〉 ⊗
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)
)
.
Next, let R : |p∗x,j〉|p˜x,j〉|0〉 → |p∗x,j〉|p˜x,j〉
(√
p∗x,j
p˜x,j
|0〉+
√
1− p
∗
x,j
p˜x,j
|1〉
)
be a rotation and let O = O˜εf⊗R
be a new oracle. We apply O followed by ΛM2(Q), where M2 =
⌈
1
2
(
3π(π+1)
2(3π+2)θ + 1
)⌉
and Q = −O(I⊗
S0)O
−1(I⊗Sχ); S0 and Sχ are defined appropriately. ΛM2 is controlled by the register |m∗x,j〉, and Q
is applied to the registers |x〉 and |0m+1〉|0〉 if the last qubit is |1〉. Let Ox denote the unitary operator
such that O|x〉|0m+1〉|0〉 = |x〉Ox|0m+1〉|0〉. Then we have the state (From here, we write only the
last three registers.)
M−1∑
j=0
δx,j√
2
(|0m+1〉|0〉|0〉+Qmx,jx Ox (|0m+1〉|0〉) |1〉) , (2)
where Qx = −OxS0O−1x Sχ and mx,j = min(m∗x,j,M2) for any x, j. We will show that the phase flip
oracle is simulated if the third register |θ˜x,j〉 has the good estimation of θx and the last register has
|1〉. Equation (2) can be rewritten as
M−1∑
j=0
δx,j√
2
(
|0m+1, 0〉|0〉+
(
(−1)f(x)γx,j|0m+1, 0〉 + |ϕx,j〉
)
|1〉
)
,
where |ϕx,j〉 is orthogonal to |0m+1, 0〉 and its norm is
√
1− γ2x,j. Suppose that the third register has
|θ˜x,j〉 such that |θx − θ˜x,j| ≤ θx3(π+1) . It can be seen that mx,j ≤M2 if |θx − θ˜x,j| ≤ θx3(π+1) . Therefore,
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Qx is applied for m
∗
x,j times, i.e., the number specified by the fourth register. Like the analysis of
Lemma 2 in [13], it is shown that γx,j ≥
√
1− 19 .
Finally, applying an Hadmard transformation to the last qubit again, we have the state
M−1∑
j=0
δx,j
2
(
(1 + (−1)f(x)γx,j)|0m+2〉|0〉
+ (1− (−1)f(x)γx,j)|0m+2〉|1〉+ |ϕx,j〉(|0〉 − |1〉)
)
.
If we measure the last qubit, we have |f(x)〉 with probability
M−1∑
j=0


∣∣∣∣δx,j(1 + γx,j)2
∣∣∣∣
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
δx,j
√
1− γ2x,j
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≥ 1
2
∑
j:|θx−θ˜x,j |≤ θ3(π+1)
|δx,j |2 (1 + γx,j) ≥ 2
3
.
Thus, the final quantum state can be rewritten as |x〉(αx|wx〉|f(x)〉+βx|w′x〉|f(x)〉, where |αx|2 ≥ 2/3
for any x.
The query complexity of this algorithm is the cost of amplitude estimation M1 and amplitude
amplification M2, thus a total number of queries is O(
1
θ ) = O(
1
ε ). Therefore, we can simulate a single
query to O
1/6
f using O(
1
ε ) queries to O
ε
f . ⊓⊔
⊓⊔
Now, we describe the main theorem to compute OR functions with quantum biased oracles.
Theorem 3 There exists a quantum algorithm to compute N -bit OR with probability at least 2/3
using O(
√
N/ε) queries to a given oracle Oεf if we know ε. Moreover, if we know εmin, the algorithm
uses Θ(
√
N/εmin) queries.
Proof. The upper bound O(
√
N/ε) is obtained by Lemma 1 and [12]. In [12], we can see an algorithm
to compute OR with probability at least 2/3 using O(
√
N) queries to an oracle O
1/6
f . When an oracle
Oεf and a value of ε are given, we can simulate one query to an oracle O
1/6
f using O(1/ε) queries to
Oεf by Lemma 1. Therefore, we can compute OR using O(
√
N/ε) queries to an oracle Oεf .
The lower bound Ω(
√
N/εmin) is also obtained by Theorem 6 in [13]. The theorem states that for
any problem, if the lower bound Ω(T ) can be shown by Ambainis’ method in the noiseless case, then
the lower bound Ω(T/εmin) can also be shown in the noisy case. For computing N -bit OR functions,
Ω(
√
N) can be shown by Ambainis’ method; therefore, we can derive Ω(
√
N/εmin) in the quantum
biased setting. ⊓⊔
⊓⊔
4 Estimating Unknown ε
In Sect.3, we described algorithms by using a given oracle Oεf when we know ε. In this section, we
assume that there is no prior knowledge of ε.
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Our overall approach is to estimate ε with appropriate accuracy (in precise εmin) in advance,
which then can be used in the simulating algorithm in Lemma 1. In the following, we first describe
an overview of our strategy to estimate εmin rather informally, followed by rigorous and detailed
descriptions.
First, let us consider estimating εx in the same way as Lemma 1 in quantum parallelism. Then,
let M∗ denote the number of required oracle calls to achieve a good estimation of εx for any x. (Here,
good means accurate enough to perform effective amplitude amplification in Lemma 1.) Note that
M∗ ∈ Ω(1/εmin), and if we know the value of ε, we can set Θ(1/ε) asM∗. However, now ε is unknown,
we estimate M∗ as follows. First we will construct an algorithm, Aenough, which receives an input M
and decides whetherM is the number of oracle calls to obtain a good estimation of εx. More precisely,
Aenough uses O(M) queries and returns 0 if the input M is large enough to estimate εx, otherwise it
returns 1 with a more than constant probability, say, 9/10. Then, by using Aenough in a superposition
of |x〉 as in Lemma 4, we can obtain the state ∑x |x〉 ⊗ (αx|ux〉|1〉+ βx|u′x〉|0〉). When M is small,
the condition ∃x; |αx|2 ≥ 9/10 holds, which means there exists x such that the estimation of εx may
be bad. On the other hand, when M is sufficiently large, the condition ∀x; |αx|2 ≤ 1/10 holds, which
means the estimation is good for any x. Our remaining essential task, then, is to know an input value
of M at the verge of the above two cases. Note that the value is Θ(1/εmin), which can be used as M
∗.
Next, we consider an algorithm, Acheck, which can distinguish the above two cases with O(T )
oracle queries with a constant probability. Then, M∗ can be estimated by O(TM∗ log logM∗) queries
by the following search technique and majority voting: We can find M∗ by trying Acheck along with
exponentially increasing the input value M until Acheck succeeds. Note that a log logM∗ factor is
needed to boost the success probability of Acheck to close to 1. It should be noted that we cannot use
robust quantum search algorithm [12] as Acheck, since there may exist x such that |αx|2 ≈ 1/2, which
cannot be dealt with by their algorithm. Instead, in Lemma 5, we will describe the algorithm Acheck,
which can distinguish the above two cases by using amplitude estimation querying for O(
√
N logN)
times. Then, the whole algorithm requires O(TM∗ log logM∗) = O
(√
N logN
εmin
log log 1εmin
)
queries. In
Lemma 4, we present an algorithm Par Est Zero that acts as Aenough in a superposition of |x〉, and
in Lemma 5, we describe the algorithm Chk Amp Dn as Acheck. Finally, the whole algorithm to
estimate M∗ is presented in Theorem 4.
Lemma 4 Let O be any quantum algorithm that uses no measurements such that O|x〉|0〉 = |x〉|Ψx〉 =
|x〉(|Ψ1x〉+ |Ψ0x〉). Let χ : Z → {0, 1} be a Boolean function that divides a state |Ψx〉 into a good state
|Ψ1x〉 and a bad state |Ψ0x〉 such that sin2(θx) = 〈Ψ1x|Ψ1x〉 for any x (0 < θx ≤ π/2). There exists a
quantum algorithm Par Est Zero(O, χ,M) that changes states as follows:
|x〉|0〉|0〉 → |x〉 ⊗ (αx|ux〉|1〉+ βx|u′x〉|0〉) ,
where |αx|2 = sin
2(Mθx)
M2 sin2(θx)
for any x. It uses O and its inverse for O(M) times.
Proof. The algorithm Par Est Zero(O, χ,M) acts as Par Est Phase(O, χ,M) from Step 1 to Step 5,
and applies a unitary transformation corresponding to the following function g′(x) instead of gM (x)
at Step 6,
g′(x) =
{
1 (x = 0)
0 (otherwise).
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Then, like (3) we have the state
|x〉 ⊗ −ı√
2
(
eıθx |Ψ+x 〉
(
α+x,0|0〉|1〉 +
M−1∑
j=1
α+x,j|j〉|0〉
)
− e−ıθx |Ψ−x 〉
(
α−x,0|0〉|1〉 +
M−1∑
j=1
α−x,j|j〉|0〉
))
,
where |α±x,j|2 =
sin2(M∆±x,jπ)
M2 sin2(∆±x,jπ)
such that ∆+x,j = d(
j
M ,
θx
π ) and ∆
−
x,j = d(
j
M , 1− θxπ ) for any x, j. (Precisely
speaking, |α±x,j |2 = 1 when ∆±x,j = 0. However, ∆±x,0 6= 0 since θx 6= 0 in this case.) Note that |Ψ+x 〉
and |Ψ−x 〉 are mutually orthogonal and 〈Ψ±x |Ψ±x 〉 = 1. Therefore, for any x the last qubit has |1〉 with
probability
|α+x,0|2
2
+
|α−x,0|2
2
=
sin2(Mθx)
M2 sin2(θx)
.
Par Est Zero(O, χ,M) requires O(M) queries to O. They are used when the algorithm is working
as Par Est Phase(O, χ,M). ⊓⊔
⊓⊔
Lemma 5 Let O be any quantum oracle such that O|x〉|0〉|0〉 = |x〉(αx|wx〉|1〉 + βx|ux〉|0〉). There
exists a quantum algorithm Chk Amp Dn(O) that outputs b ∈ {0, 1} such that
b =


1 if ∃x; |αx|2 ≥ 910
0 if ∀x; |αx|2 ≤ 110
don′t care otherwise,
with probability at least 8/π2 using O(
√
N logN) queries to O.
Proof. Using O(logN) applications of O and majority voting, we have a new oracle O′ such that
O′|x〉|0〉|0〉 = |x〉(α′x|w′x〉|1〉 + β′x|u′x〉|0〉),
where |α′x|2 ≥ 1− 116N if |αx|2 ≥ 910 , and |α′x|2 ≤ 116N if |αx|2 ≤ 110 . Note that work bits |w′x〉 and |u′x〉
are likely larger than |wx〉 and |ux〉.
Now, let A be a quantum algorithm that makes the uniform superposition 1√
N
∑
x |x〉|0〉|0〉 by the
Fourier transform FN and applies the oracle O′. We consider (success) probability p that the last
qubit in the final state A|0〉 has |1〉. If the given oracle O satisfies ∃x; |αx|2 ≥ 910 (we call Case 1),
the probability p is at least 1N × (1 − 116N ) ≥ 1516N . On the other hand, if O satisfies ∀x; |αx|2 ≤ 110
(we call Case 2), then the probability p ≤ N × 1N × 116N = 116N . We can distinguish the two cases by
amplitude estimation as follows.
Let θ˜p denote the output of the amplitude estimation Est Phase(A, χ, ⌈11
√
N⌉). The whole
algorithm Chk Amp Dn(O) performs Est Phase(A, χ, ⌈11√N⌉) and outputs whether θ˜p is greater
than 0.68/
√
N or not. We will show that it is possible to distinguish the above two cases by the value
of θ˜p. Let θp = sin
−1(
√
p) such that 0 ≤ θp ≤ π/2. Note that x ≤ sin−1(x) ≤ πx/2 if 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Theorem 2 says that in Case 1, the Est Phase outputs θ˜p such that
θ˜p ≥ θp − π
11
√
N
≥
√
15
16N
− π
11
√
N
>
0.68√
N
,
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with probability at least 8/π2. Similarly in Case 2, the inequality θ˜p <
0.68√
N
is obtained.
Chk Amp Dn(O) uses O for O(√N logN) times since Chk Amp Dn(O) calls the algorithm A for
⌈11√N⌉ times and A uses O(logN) queries to the given oracle O. ⊓⊔
⊓⊔
Theorem 4 Given a quantum biased oracle Oεf , there exists a quantum algorithm Est Eps Min(O
ε
f )
that outputs ε˜min such that εmin/5π
2 ≤ ε˜min ≤ εmin with probability at least 2/3. The query complexity
of the algorithm is expected to be O
(√
N logN
εmin
log log 1εmin
)
.
Proof. Let sin(θx) = 2εx and sin(θmin) = 2εmin such that 0 < θx, θmin ≤ π2 . Let χ also be a Boolean
function that divides the state in (1) into a good state (−1)f(x)2εx|0m+1〉 and a bad state |ψx〉.
Thus Par Est Zero(O˜εf , χ,M) in Lemma 4 makes the state |x〉 ⊗ (αx|ux〉|1〉+ βx|u′x〉|0〉) such that
|αx|2 = sin
2(Mθx)
M2 sin2(θx)
. As stated below, if M ∈ o(1/θx), then |αx|2 ≥ 9/10. We can use Chk Amp Dn
to check whether there exists x such that |αx|2 ≥ 9/10. Based on these facts, we present the whole
algorithm Est Eps Min(Oεf ).
Algorithm( Est Eps Min(Oεf ) )
1. Start with ℓ = 0.
2. Increase ℓ by 1.
3. Run Chk Amp Dn(Par Est Zero(O˜εf , χ, 2
ℓ)) for O(log ℓ) times and use majority voting. If “1”
is output as the result of the majority voting, then return to Step 2.
4. Output ε˜min =
1
2 sin
(
1
5·2ℓ
)
.
Now, we will show that the algorithm almost keeps running until ℓ >
⌊
log2
1
5θmin
⌋
. We assume
ℓ ≤
⌊
log2
1
5θmin
⌋
. Under this assumption, a proposition ∃x; |αx|2 ≥ 910 holds since the equation
εmin = minx εx guarantees that there exists some x such that θmin = θx and |αx|2 = sin
2(2ℓθx)
22ℓ sin2(θx)
≥
cos2(15 ) >
9
10 when 2
ℓ ≤ 15θx . Therefore, a single Chk Amp Dn run returns “1” with probability at
least 8/π2. By O(log ℓ) repetitions and majority voting, the probability that we obtain “1” increases
to at least 1 − 1
5ℓ2
. Consequently, the overall probability that we return from Step 3 to Step 2
for any ℓ such that ℓ ≤
⌊
log2
1
5θmin
⌋
is at least
∏⌊log2 15θmin ⌋
ℓ=1
(
1− 1
5ℓ2
)
> 23 . This inequality can be
obtained by considering an infinite product expansion of sin(x), i.e., sin(x) = x
∏∞
n=1
(
1− x2
n2π2
)
at
x = π/
√
5. Thus the algorithm keeps running until ℓ >
⌊
log2
1
5θmin
⌋
, i.e., outputs ε˜min such that
ε˜min =
1
2 sin
(
1
5·2ℓ
) ≤ 12 sin(θmin) = εmin, with probability at least 2/3.
We can also show that the algorithm almost stops in ℓ <
⌈
log2
2π
θmin
⌉
. Since sin
2(Mθ)
M2 sin2(θ)
≤ π2
(2Mθ)2
when 0 ≤ θ ≤ π2 , |αx|2 = sin
2(2ℓθx)
22ℓ sin2(θx)
≤ 116 for any x if 2ℓ ≥ 2πθmin . Therefore, in Step 3, “0” is returned
with probability at least 8/π2 when ℓ ≥
⌈
log2
2π
θmin
⌉
. The algorithm, thus, outputs ε˜min =
1
2 sin
(
1
5·2ℓ
) ≥
1
2 sin(
θmin
10π ) ≥ εmin5π2 with probability at least 8/π2.
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Let ℓ˜ satisfy
⌊
log2
1
5θmin
⌋
< ℓ˜ <
⌈
log2
2π
θmin
⌉
. If the algorithm runs until ℓ = ℓ˜, its query complexity
is
ℓ˜∑
ℓ=1
O(2ℓ
√
N logN log ℓ) = O(2ℓ˜
√
N logN log ℓ˜) = O
(√
N logN
εmin
log log
1
εmin
)
,
since 2ℓ˜ ∈ Θ
(
1
θmin
)
= Θ
(
1
εmin
)
. ⊓⊔
⊓⊔
Remark. As mentioned above, we have some way to deal with quantum biased oracles even if we
have no knowledge about the given oracle’s bias rate. On the other hand, in the classical biased
setting, there seems to be no way if the value of ε is unknown: Suppose that classical biased oracles
return a correct value with probability at least 1/2 + ε for each query. It is known that by using
O(1/ε2) queries and majority voting, the probability that oracles answer queries correctly increases
to 2/3. However, this algorithm works effectively when we know ε. In other words, unless we know
ε, it is likely impossible to determine an appropriate number of majority voting to achieve at least a
constant success probability of the whole algorithm.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that O(
√
N/ε) queries are enough to compute N -bit OR with an ε-biased
oracle. This matches the known lower bound while affirmatively answering the conjecture raised by
the paper [13]. The result in this paper implies other matching bounds such as computing parity
with Θ(N/ε) queries. We also show a quantum algorithm that estimates unknown value of ε with an
ε-biased oracle. Then, by using the estimated value, we can construct a robust algorithm even when
ε is unknown. This contrasts with the corresponding classical case where no good estimation method
seems to exist.
Until now, unfortunately, we have had essentially only one quantum algorithm, i.e., the robust
quantum search algorithm [12], to cope with imperfect oracles. (Note that other algorithms, including
our own algorithm in Theorem 3, are all based on the robust quantum search algorithm [12].) Thus, it
should be interesting to seek another essentially different quantum algorithm with imperfect oracles. If
we find a new quantum algorithm that uses O(T ) queries to imperfect oracles with constant probability,
then we can have a quantum algorithm that uses O(T/ε) queries to imperfect oracles with an ε-biased
oracle based on our method. This is different from the classical case where we need an overhead factor
of O(1/ε2) by majority voting.
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Appendix
Here, we describe the algorithm and the proof of Lemma 3 after providing a few definitions. The
algorithm Par Est Phase(O, χ,M) is based on the amplitude estimation algorithm in [7]. We refer
interested readers to [7].
Definition 4 For any two real numbers ω0, ω1 ∈ R,
d(ω0, ω1) = min
z∈Z
{|z + ω1 − ω0|}.
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Thus 2πd(ω0, ω1) is the length of the shortest arc on the unit circle going from e
2πıω0 to e2πıω1 .
Note that 0 ≤ d(ω0, ω1) ≤ 12 for any ω0, ω1.
Definition 5 For any integer M ≥ 1, let gM (x) be a function defined by
gM (x) =
{
πx
M (0 ≤ x ≤ M2 )
π − πxM (M2 ≤ x < M).
Algorithm( Par Est Phase(O, χ,M) )
1. Start with the state |x〉|0〉|0〉|0〉.
2. Apply O to the first and the second registers.
3. Apply FM to the third register.
4. Apply ΛM (Q) controlled by the third register, where Q = −O(I⊗S0)O−1(I⊗Sχ). Q is applied
to the first and the second registers.
5. Apply F−1M to the third register.
6. Apply the unitary transformation UgM to the third and the fourth registers, where UgM maps
|x〉|0〉 to |x〉|gM (x)〉.
Proof. (of Lemma 3)
When θx = 0,
π
2 , the analysis can be performed almost like the following; therefore, we assume
0 < θx <
π
2 for any x. Focusing on the subspace where the first register has a basis state |x〉, the
transformation QjxOx is applied to the second register, where Qx = −OxS0O−1x Sχ and j is the number
designated by the third register. Since this situation is the same as in Theorem 12 in [7], the analysis
can be done similarly. Let
|Ψ±x 〉 =
1√
2
(
1
sin θx
|Ψ1x〉 ±
ı
cos θx
|Ψ0x〉
)
.
Note that |Ψ+x 〉 and |Ψ−x 〉 are orthonormal eigenvectors of Qx. After Step 6, we can obtain the state
|x〉 ⊗ −ı√
2
(
eıθx |Ψ+x 〉
(M−1∑
j=0
α+x,j|j〉|gM (j)〉
)
− e−ıθx |Ψ−x 〉
(M−1∑
j=0
α−x,j|j〉|gM (j)〉
))
, (3)
where |α±x,j|2 =
sin2(M∆±x,jπ)
M2 sin2(∆±
x,j
π)
such that ∆+x,j = d(
j
M ,
θx
π ) and ∆
−
x,j = d(
j
M , 1− θxπ ) for any x, j. (Precisely
speaking, |α±x,j |2 = 1 when ∆±x,j = 0. This condition means that Mθxπ or M − Mθxπ is an integer.) This
follows Theorem 11 in [7].
We will show that the last register has the good estimations of θx with high probability in the final
state. Now, let j+1 = ⌊Mθxπ ⌋ and j+2 = ⌈Mθxπ ⌉. 0 < θx < π2 means 0 ≤ j+i ≤ M2 , thus gM (j+i ) =
j+i π
M
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holds. We can prove |α+
x,j+1
|2+ |α+
x,j+2
|2 ≥ 8π2 and |θx− gM (j+i )| ≤ πM like Theorem 11 in [7]. Similarly,
let j−1 =M − ⌊Mθxπ ⌋ and j−2 =M − ⌈Mθxπ ⌉. 0 < θx < π2 means M2 ≤ j−i ≤M , thus gM (j−i ) = π−
j−i π
M
holds. (This holds when M2 ≤ j−i < M . When j−i = M , we consider j−i = 0, then the following
sentences will hold.) We can also prove |α−
x,j−1
|2 + |α−
x,j−2
|2 ≥ 8
π2
and |θx − gM (j−i )| ≤ πM . Thus the
probability that the last register |gM (j)〉 has an estimated value θ˜x such that |θx − θ˜x| ≤ πM is
∑
j:|θx−gM (j)|≤ πM
|α+x,j|2
2
+
∑
j:|θx−gM (j)|≤ πM
|α−x,j |2
2
≥
∑
j∈{j+1 ,j+2 }
|α+x,j|2
2
+
∑
j∈{j−1 ,j−2 }
|α−x,j |2
2
≥ 8
π2
.
Therefore, the well-estimated values of θx lie in the last register with probability at least 8/π
2. ⊓⊔
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